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I’m a law professor who works on gender, sexuality, and culture in the 
international and comparative context. That’s my head working. In “real” life, 
my partner, Howard, and I have been engaged in having a baby together for 
several years, a project that came to fruition with the birth of our daughter 
Melina. Of course, such a project evokes intensely complex feelings and 
thoughts. Beyond a simple transposition of the personal onto the political, I feel 
so fortunate to have engaged in myriad conversations with a variety of friends 
and colleagues who think much more carefully about the family and different 
aspects of race, class, gender, and sexuality than I do. Fascinating 
conversations also arose with people who work in the less clearly related fields 
of administrative law, law and economics, public international law, 
international commercial law, and law and psychology. These conversations 
have reshaped my understanding of the boundaries among self, family, and 
society, and have given me a faith in our profession that, despite the hierarchies 
and occasional pettiness, we law professors are a warm and supportive bunch.
As Howard and I awaited the birth of our child, I wrote down some of my 
thoughts on these conversations to memorialize them so that others could share 
them. Scholarship abounds on parenting and families: surrogacy, in-vitro 
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* * * 
ALL IN THE FAMILY 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Jacob Willig-Onwuachi 
Introduction 
Your essay “Pregnant Man?” highlights many significant issues concerning 
the intersection of law, gender, sexuality, race, class, and family. In an earlier 
article A House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family,115 we 
explored many of these issues as they relate to multiracial families, including 
our own. Specifically, we, a black female-white male married couple, analyzed 
the language in housing discrimination statutes to demonstrate how law and 
society function together to frame the normative ideal of family as heterosexual 
and monoracial. Our article examined the daily social privileges of monoracial, 
heterosexual couples as a means of revealing the invisibility of interracial 
marriages and families within our society and analyzed how this invisibility is 
both reflected in and reinforced by the language of housing discrimination 
statutes. We followed a framework introduced by Peggy McIntosh, outlining 
unearned and unacknowledged privileges of heterosexual couples and their 
families; we then used Kimberlé Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality to 
explain how multiracial couples and families may experience societal benefits 
and disadvantages differently based on various intersections of identity 
categories. Our analysis of housing discrimination statutes demonstrated how 
the assumption that plaintiffs will be monoracial, heterosexual couples fails to 
fully address the harms to interracial, heterosexual couples that experience 
discrimination in housing and rental searches because of their interraciality—
their race-mixing—as opposed to any person’s individual race. In other words, 
it revealed how societal norms about who constitutes a family have been 
codified in a manner that ultimately denies legal recognition of all the harms of 
discrimination for certain couples and families.116 
                                                           
115. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility of the 
Multiracial Family, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231 (2009). 
116. As we noted in our article, id. at 233 n.10, we did not directly focus on LGBT families 
because sexual orientation is not recognized as a protected class in most housing discrimination statutes, 
leaving LGBT, monoracial families completely unprotected and LGBT, multiracial families vulnerable 
at even more intersections. Our focus in our article was to unpack assumptions about groups that were 
viewed as already fully protected by the law, even as that lack of protection may relate to only 
expressive harms. 
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In reading your essay, “Pregnant Man?”, we were struck by how your 
experiences and considerations in adding Melina to your family exposed these 
mutually reinforcing roles that law and society play in defining the normative 
family. Your thoughts and experience easily add one more piece of evidence to 
support contentions we made in our article. 
Your essay is replete with examples of how family law serves as the means 
for identifying the intimate relationships that will be facilitated by government 
and how society works to reinforce those legal norms. As you show, law and 
society build on each other and match each other in substance and practice.  In 
particular, you first reveal how the ideal of family as centered around a 
heterosexual couple is used to enforce and reinforce the expected roles of men 
and women, not just in terms of their places in intimate relationships but also 
with respect to parenting. Second, you expose the racial hierarchies among 
even those families that fit this ideal in terms of racial constitution and 
sexuality. 
A.  “Optimal” Mothers (and Fathers) 
In examining the intersection of sex, sexuality, and the law, you show how 
family law—in particular, adoption law—shapes the image of the American 
family as formed around an intimate, heterosexual couple. First, as your entire 
essay reveals, the law’s construction of particular roles for men and women in 
families with children worked to define how you named yourself in relation to 
Melina, with you ultimately deciding to call yourself “papi” even though you 
really felt like you were “about to become a mother.”117 Your struggles in 
naming and defining yourself in relation to Melina reminded us of Lofton v. 
Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services,118 where the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals more or less declared that the roles for men 
and women as parents in families are inflexible and announced its belief that 
the optimal way for children of both sexes to learn how to be a woman or man 
is to observe interactions and life between a man and a woman who are 
intimately involved with each other. In Lofton, the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
Florida statute banning gays and lesbians from adopting did not violate either 
the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause. In so doing, the court 
accepted as legitimate the state of Florida’s interests in preserving the 
supposedly clear and fixed roles for men and women as parents through a 
statute designed to prevent families like your “necessarily motherless”119 
family from raising and teaching Melina how to be a woman. The court wrote: 
                                                           
117. See Rosenblum, supra text following note 15. 
118. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
119. Id. at 819. 
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Florida argues that the statute is rationally related to Florida’s interest 
in furthering the best interests of adopted children by placing them in 
families with married mothers and fathers. Such homes, Florida 
asserts, provide the stability that marriage affords and the presence of 
both male and female authority figures, which it considers critical to 
optimal childhood development and socialization. In particular, Florida 
emphasizes a vital role that dual-gender parenting plays in shaping 
sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual role 
modeling. Florida argues that disallowing adoption into homosexual 
households, which are necessarily motherless or fatherless and lack the 
stability that comes with marriage, is a rational means of furthering 
Florida’s interest in promoting adoption by marital families.120 
As the Florida statute121 and the Lofton case demonstrate, the law in many 
contexts shapes and defines what is established as a “real” or “true” family—a 
family with a mother and a father. It also shapes who can be considered a 
mother or father. Lofton suggests that a mother can be only a person who was 
biologically born a woman, who in turn is supposed to model for a little girl 
what it means to be a woman, and a father can be only a person who was 
biologically born a man, who in turn is obligated to model for a little boy what 
it means to be a man. 
Such social prejudices provide the foundation for resistance to families that 
are, by their nature, “motherless” or “fatherless”: families that are headed by 
LGBT persons, especially those headed by men. Wrapped up in this 
understanding is the notion that you, a man who loves another man and, thus, a 
man who is not a “real” man, could never be a father. Also wrapped up in this 
understanding is the idea that no man, including you and Howard, can “mother” 
(and that no mother can “father”). As one of our white, heterosexual male 
friends experienced when he sought to adopt a child as a single man, people are 
skeptical in general about the intentions of men who want to adopt. People 
often wonder, “Why would a man want children absent a woman?” Our friend 
had no luck in his efforts to adopt a child as a single man. At best, some viewed 
him as crazy because men simply do not “mother.” At worst, some viewed him 
as deviant—as a pedophile who wanted to adopt his victims in order to violate 
them in his own private home. That this avenue of adopting children as a single 
male, which comes with its own difficulties, is often the only way in which gay 
male couples can adopt speaks volumes about the strong and powerfully 
exclusionary roles of law and society in defining legitimate families. 
This reality in itself automatically excludes LGBT families from societal 
conceptions of “real families.” In our society, the presumption for LBGT 
                                                           
120. Id. at 818-19. 
121. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002), invalidated by In re Adoption of X.X.G., No. 3D08-3044, 
2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 14014 (Fla. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010). 
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families is that such families are an alternative for families with two parents of 
the opposite sex and, in particular, are an alternative for adopted kids. 
Against this backdrop, we applauded your decision to challenge this 
“social presumption’s predetermination of [your] family[]”122 by pursuing a 
biologically-related baby through surrogacy. After all, such a decision could 
only work to disrupt the notion of the “normal” or even “ideal” family. But we 
still wondered why you decided to accept this particular challenge versus 
others,123 because as you detail, surrogacy contracts and arrangements, 
although they can be risky for any couple, are especially worrisome for gay 
male couples. For example, varying laws from state to state made it even more 
difficult for you and Howard to trust that your rights under any contract would 
be recognized, resulting in your “minor meltdown when [your] Skadden-trained 
mind contemplated an agreement governed by Oklahoma law.”124 
Likewise, your own reluctance as you travelled to Oklahoma to meet the 
surrogate for Melina, Beth, highlighted the social stigmas that attach to the 
notion of gay parents. As a general matter, it is hard for us, as your friends, to 
imagine that you—”gregarious . . . with friends in Paris or Tokyo or 
shopkeepers in Marrakech or Rio”—would be “super nervous about getting 
along with people [you] feared would be very different . . . .”125 In our eyes, 
you could make anybody in any context fall in love with you. But reading 
about your worry in meeting Beth in Oklahoma reinforced for us just how 
much social stigma and prejudice can turn what should be simple meetings into 
frightening encounters. We very much understood the apprehension. 
B.  Racial Constitutions 
Most of all, given our previous work, we were drawn to your story about 
how racial norms worked to design the final image of your family. Even as you 
and Howard were able to avoid legal obstacles in ultimately giving birth to 
Melina, social norms as well as the lingering effects of past legal definitions of 
blackness shaped the racial constitution of your family. 
Certain of those influences were seemingly (though not actually) small, but 
powerfully revealing in their racism and identification of a monoracial family 
as the ideal, such as the question by your friend, another law professor: “Why 
pay all that money for a black kid when you can adopt?”126 For example, your 
friend’s question exposed the power of the one-drop rule in our society. As you 
explain in “Pregnant Man?”, biological connections between parents and 
                                                           
122. See id. text following note 5. 
123. See Onwuachi-Willig & Willig-Onwuachi, infra Part B, Racial Constitutions. 
124. Rosenblum, supra text accompanying note 10 (citations omitted). 
125. Id. text following note 9. 
126. Id. text following note 7 (paragraph beginning “This drew some . . . .”). 
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children take on an importance of their own in our society. Yet, simply because 
your first, preferred egg donor could have been black, your friend discounted 
the biological connection that a child born through surrogacy would have to 
either you or Howard. In his eyes, one drop of black blood marked your 
potential child with the black donor as “just another black child,” one who 
could be adopted for a cheaper price, as opposed to your or Howard’s 
biologically related, biracial child, which, because of the costs of surrogacy, 
would come at a higher price.  In other words, the child could only truly be 
yours and Howard’s and worth the cost if she were white; if your child could 
not be purely white, why expend too many resources on adding her to your 
family? Such comments by your friend expose the continuing and dangerous 
effects of racial identity laws and cases that drew sharp lines between white and 
non-white. These lines not only continue to make it difficult for multiracial 
individuals to define themselves according to their personal preferences, just as 
you could not freely define yourself as a mother as you wished to do;127 they 
also persist in forcing multiracial families, including LGBT multiracial 
families, to fight to be families or at least be recognized as families. 
Additionally, your friend’s question about your possibly spending “all that 
money” on a black baby highlights the hierarchy of societal value placed on 
even monoracial, heterosexual couples and on black children in general. Your 
friend’s comments reminded Angela of the 1980s Cabbage Patch Doll craze 
along with a joke from a white classmate about the costs of the black Cabbage 
Patch Dolls, which he claimed were five dollars cheaper than the white ones. 
That classmate remarked that the cheaper cost was why he bought a black 
Cabbage Patch Doll. In today’s version of a different story about costs and 
dolls, it is the black Barbie that gets marked down half-price while the white 
Barbie remains at full price at Wal-Mart.128 Your friend’s statement similarly 
reveals the generally lower value placed on black children and ultimately their 
families. As Professor Heather Dalmage has highlighted in her book Tripping 
on the Color Line: Black-White Multiracial Families in a Racially Divided 
World, nowhere are these values more telling than in the adoption arena, where 
there are “race-related price tags placed on children available for adoption.”129 
For example, “in 1990 a U.S. agency published a price list for adoption: white 
children cost $7,500, biracial children $3,800, and black children $2,200.”130 
As Professor Barbara Fedders contends, adoption agencies that use such race-
                                                           
127. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v. Rhinelander as a 
Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2393, 2451-54 (2007). 
128. Steve Parker, Walmart Discounts Black Barbie Doll, Leaves White Version Full-Price, 
STLTODAY.COM (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/columns/conversation-about 
-race/article_3a6112a3-02c1-53da-bf1e-19faa50cdc07.html. 
129. HEATHER M. DALMAGE, TRIPPING ON THE COLOR LINE:  BLACK-WHITE MULTIRACIAL 
FAMILIES IN A RACIALLY DIVIDED WORLD 156-57 (2000). 
130. Id. at 157 (citing RITA J. SIMON ET AL., THE CASE FOR TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1994)). 
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based pricing—”set[ting] lower fees for black children than for white ones”—
not only “send a message that black children are less valuable than white” but 
also “reinforce[] the notion of whiteness as a property right.”131 
Other influences on your decision of an egg donor exposed broader 
insights into the microaggressions and macroaggressions faced by white gay 
parents with children of color. Like you, our initial reaction was one of hope 
that you and Howard would push the boundaries of race and family by 
selecting your preferred minority donor—”a tall, attractive provider with a 
great undergraduate affiliation.”132 Just as your decision to use a surrogate 
worked to challenge the accepted notion of LGBT parents as an alternative to 
opposite-sex parents, we wanted your choice of an egg donor to challenge the 
normative ideal of family as monoracial. However, your reflection on the white 
gay couple on Rosie’s Family Cruise that was accused of trafficking as they 
tried to bring their differently raced child across the border was extremely 
powerful.133 While we question your other friend’s idea that racial difference 
would make the child of gay parents even “more” of an outsider, we could not 
deny the fear that such encounters during travel would surely and repeatedly 
invoke in your lives. 
The Rosie’s Family Cruise story reminded us of very recent experiences 
that we, a black-white heterosexual couple, had while traveling with our own 
biracial children and another family, a black-white lesbian couple, Catherine 
Smith and Jennifer Holladay, and their monoracial, black child, Zoe, to the 
Caribbean. Our very presence as a group of travelers destabilized the normative 
familial images of other people we encountered on the plane or at our resort. 
People stared (and stared hard, too) at us, not knowing quite how to understand 
us, but still all the while understanding us as connected to each other somehow. 
As a group, we discussed the possibility that other resort guests viewed us 
all as part of a polygamist family—Jacob with his three wives and mocha 
children.134 If our group was, for any reason, separated into smaller groups, it 
generated greater confusion among our fellow travelers. If we, Jacob and 
Angela, were ever together alone with Jennifer, who is white, and the kids, 
people often assumed that Jacob and Jennifer were married and that Angela 
was a friend with her children, resisting the notion of an interracial family at 
all. Or they saw Jacob and Jennifer together as a married couple and Angela as 
a nanny for their black children, resisting the notion that a multiracial family, 
just as you note earlier about LGBT families, could be created through any 
means other than adoption. At times, the presence of our kids threw them off, 
                                                           
131. Barbara Fedders, Race and Market Values in Domestic Infant Adoption, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 
1712 (2010). 
132. Rosenblum, supra text following note 7. 
133. Id. text accompanying note 8. 
134. Our children and the daughter of Catherine and Jennifer all have a similar skin tone. 
ROSENBLUM SAT DEC 11 556PM (DO NOT DELETE) 12/11/10  6:02 PM 
2010] Pregnant Man?: A Conversation 247 
given how much more they look like Angela, but Jennifer and Angela joked 
that it was likely easier for others to conclude that Jennifer was like a 
slaveowner’s wife who turned a blind eye to her husband’s sexual exploits—
often rape—rather than accept the image of our actual multiracial family. If we, 
Jacob and Angela, were together alone with Catherine, who is black, people 
just stared. Nothing in their minds could reconcile that combination. There was 
no conceivable explanation to them because such explanations would have 
required them either to see and accept a lesbian couple, Angela and Catherine, 
or accept one of us as Jacob’s partner and the children as products of such 
unions. 
More striking, however, were Catherine, Jennifer, and their daughter Zoe’s 
experiences in having their family explicitly and consistently disregarded by 
both law and society on the island. Before our actual trip, we, Jacob and 
Angela, worried often about potential prejudice against our friends, especially 
in light of news articles about violent homophobia in the Caribbean. There was 
no such violence, though—at least physically. Yet, Catherine and Jennifer 
encountered constant mental and emotional violence in the failed 
acknowledgement of their family. Our heterosexuality and thus our legal union 
allowed us to come through immigration as a family—together with our kids, 
even though we did not fit the monoracial ideal. However, because Catherine 
and Jennifer’s civil union was not recognized as lawful, they had to separate 
their family physically to get through immigration—Jennifer and Zoe 
approaching the official for their review and with legal adoption papers of Zoe 
by Jennifer, followed by Catherine as an individual. Only in one instance did 
someone break the social norms of heterosexuality and family. An immigration 
official told Jennifer as she approached with Zoe, “Your whole family can 
come up here. Go ahead and bring your whole family up.” Our gratefulness as a 
group for this official’s willingness to acknowledge the Smith-Holladay family 
makes perfect sense, but upon reflection, especially based on your essay, it also 
is sad. Forced reliance on others’ willingness to break with social norms and 
thus the law provides no comfort. Uneasiness always exists. 
Hopes aside, we see why you and Howard would not want to have to 
engage in such reliance. After all, as experience reveals, it is a privilege to be 
able to keep it all in the family. 
